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I. INTRODUCTION: ENDA’S PROPOSED PROTECTIONS AND WHY ITS
PASSAGE IS IMPERATIVE
When the United States Congress passed the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, known to many as Title VII, they made it illegal for an
employer to discriminate against individuals in compensation or terms
of employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.1 Congress banned limiting or classifying employees or
applicants in any way that may adversely affect their status.2 This was
a monumental change, giving federal protection to classes of people
that had traditionally suffered workplace discrimination.
However, the statute lacks explicit protection for individuals
based on sexual orientation, and the majority of courts have refused to
define sex as including sexual orientation.3 Interpreting the “sex”
protected by Title VII as biological sex (and many times interpreting
“gender” to mean the same thing), the federal courts almost uniformly
hold that Title VII does not protect against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.4 Some courts, however, following the Price

J.D., William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 2015; B.A.,
University of Oregon, 2011. Many thanks to Ann McGinley for her indispensable
comments and advice through the writing process.
1
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
2
Id.
3
See Ann C. McGinley, Erasing Boundaries: Masculinities, Sexual Minorities, and
Employment Discrimination, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 713, 714 (2010).
4
Id.; see also DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding that Title VII protection cannot be extended to discrimination against sexual
preference), abrogated by, Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864 (9th Cir.
2001).
∗
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Waterhouse v. Hopkins standard, have extended prohibition against
discrimination based on “sex” to include gender and its stereotypes.5
At least one scholar argues that this is a misinterpretation of the
law, positing that Title VII’s protection against discrimination
“because of sex” should protect gays and lesbians, as the basis of the
discrimination “occurs because of the sex or gender of the harasser and
of the victim.”6 Others argue that winning a case under existing Title
VII provisions is possible as long as plaintiffs use a sex stereotyping
argument, “distance themselves from any characterization of the
harassment that would hint at prejudice against gays and lesbians, and
focus instead on the specific stereotyping that they suffered and the
way these stereotypes are connected with gender.”7
While scholars argue that Title VII should or already does
protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation, Congress
has regularly considered legislation that would answer this question
unequivocally.
Such legislation, which would explicitly ban
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, has been repeatedly
introduced and rejected since 1974, and is currently under
consideration in the latest form of the Employment NonDiscrimination Act (ENDA).8
Though there have been amendments to Title VII, including the
sex discrimination provisions, they have not been helpful to sexual
minorities.
In 1972, Congress passed the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act, which “enabled the [Equal Employment Opportunity
Committee] to bring enforcement litigation in federal court and
extended Title VII’s coverage to public employers.”9 This amendment
arose because, despite Title VII, “discrimination against women
continue[d] to be widespread, and [was] regarded by many as either
morally or physiologically justifiable.”10 While many women were
optimistic in 1964, “Title VII’s promise had not been realized in the
context of sex.”11 The amendment successfully eliminated arguments
from employers who discriminated against women in order to

5

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
McGinley, supra note 3, at 716.
7
Clare Diefenbach, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment After Oncale: Meeting the
"Because of . . . Sex" Requirement, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 42, 92
(2007).
8
H.R. 14752, 93d Cong. (1974); H.R. 1755, 113th Cong. (2013).
9
See Cary Franklin, Inventing the "Traditional Concept" of Sex Discrimination, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1346 (2012) (discussing the expansion of the EEOC’s power
under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act).
10
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting H.R. REP. NO . 92-238, at 5 (1971), reprinted
in 1972 U.S.S.C.A.N. 2137, 2141).
11
Id. at 1347.
6
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“preserve conventional sex roles and maintain the traditional family
structure.”12
While eliminating some discrimination, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act did not expand protection for those
discriminated against based on their sexual orientation, or gender
identity. Congress again amended Title VII with the Civil Rights Act
of 1991; however, this act mostly overruled certain Supreme Court
decisions that had “weakened the scope and effectiveness” of Title
VII, and added remedies such as compensatory and punitive damages
as well as the ability to request a jury trial.13 It did not add any explicit
protection for sexual minorities.14
This paper argues that legislation protecting homosexuals from
employment discrimination is necessary, despite hopeful arguments
that the text of Title VII should or can protect against discrimination
based on sexual orientation. It also discusses how federal court
precedent has gone too far in the wrong direction to believe that courts
will fix this interpretation problem on their own. Furthermore, it
posits that the passage of ENDA, or similar legislation, will
successfully lessen the prevalence of this discrimination.
Part II considers the history of Title VII’s “because of sex”
protection, which includes a short discussion of theories of legislative
intent, and an examination of how courts have defined “sex” in the
context of Title VII. The paper then looks at a string of unsuccessful
cases where homosexuals or other sexual minorities (lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, transgender, and intersex individuals) attempted to bring
claims of discrimination under Title VII.15 Finally, the paper analyzes
the evolution of the courts’ interpretation of Title VII’s prohibition of
discrimination “because of sex,” including cases where plaintiffs, who
were not necessarily sexual minorities, succeeded in ways that could
help those claiming discrimination based on sexual orientation.16
Part III discusses the states that have addressed this issue by
passing legislation to ban discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and/or gender identity. The paper analyzes examples of
state statutes, examining the similarities and differences in various

12

Id.
Linda Urbanik, Executive Veto, Congressional Compromise, and Judicial
Confusion: The 1991 Civil Rights Act—Does it Apply Retroactively?, 24 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 109, 109-10 (1992).
14
Id.
15
See generally McGinley, supra note 3, at 713 (describing the classes of the sexual
minority).
16
See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-51 (1989) (establishing
the Price Waterhouse sex stereotyping framework).
13
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statutes. It concludes that, overall, state legislation is successful in
combatting this type of employment discrimination; however, a
national law could be equally beneficial, if not more so, because state
laws would benefit from federal clarification.
Part IV analyzes a proposed federal ban on discrimination
based on sexual orientation. This part begins with a history of past
legislative attempts, followed by an examination of the current form of
ENDA and its prospects of success in Congress. After discussing the
exact language of ENDA, Part IV considers the likely effects of
ENDA on a national scale, and concludes that the overall effects of
passing ENDA would be positive. Lastly, Part IV recommends some
amendments and changes to ENDA that could further assure its
positive effects, and cure problematic issues that have arisen in states
with similar legislation.
II. HISTORICAL TREATMENT
Congress passed Title VII in 1964, making it illegal for an
employer to discriminate against an individual based on his or her
sex.17 The “because of sex” provision immediately caused debate
within the country among employers seeking to limit the statute to
biological sex-based “employment practices that sorted men and
women into two perfectly sex-differentiated groups.”18 During this
period, members of Congress, who originally favored including the
“because of sex” provision in the statute, opposed this stance, arguing
that “Title VII barred employment practices that reflected and
reinforced traditional conceptions of women's sex and family roles,
regardless of whether those practices sorted men and women along
biological sex lines.”19 Thus, opinions in Congress split between
interpreting “sex” in the broad sense, as discussed in the previous
sentence, and the narrow sense, conflating “sex” with biological sex.20
Without much else in the way of congressional intent available, it was
up to the courts to interpret the exact meaning of “because of sex.”
The first sex discrimination case to reach the Supreme Court
insinuated that the judicial system would lean towards the narrow
meaning of “sex,” even if it was just a slight tilt of the scales.21 In

17

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
Franklin, supra note 9, at 1334.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
See Jeremy Byellin, Today in 1971: The Supreme Court Decides its First Title VII
Sex Discrimination Case, LEGAL SOLUTIONS BLOG (Jan. 25, 2013),
18
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Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., the Fifth Circuit upheld summary
judgment for an employer who disqualified women with preschool age
children from employment, holding that the plaintiff “was not refused
employment because she was a woman nor because she had pre-school
age children. It [was] the coalescence of these two elements that
denied her the position she desired.”22 The Fifth Circuit operated
under the interpretation of sex as “women vis-à-vis men,” and held
that “[w]hen another criterion of employment [wa]s added to one of
the classifications listed in the Act, there [wa]s no longer apparent
discrimination based solely on race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.”23 The Supreme Court, in a per curium opinion, overturned
this ruling, holding that “the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requir[ed] that
persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities
irrespective of their sex.”24 The Court further found that the Circuit
Court “erred in reading this section as permitting one hiring policy for
women and another for men—each having pre-school-age children.”25
While the overturning of summary judgment was a victory for
the female plaintiff in Phillips, the Court seemed to see “sex” as a
reference to biological sex, speaking only of how the policy affected
men and women differently.26 This rigid reading appears at odds with
the goals of some of the original proponents of including a ban on sex
discrimination in Title VII.27 Though later courts claimed that this
reading was “deeply rooted in the American legal tradition,” it only
stemmed from Title VII’s passage seven short years before Phillips.28
This reading was promulgated by arguments from employers and
conservatives who feared that Title VII “would upend traditional
gender norms and sexual conventions, and disrupt forms of regulation
that defined what it meant to be a man or a woman.”29 Proponents of
including “sex” in Title VII did not foresee this strict reading,
believing that they were supporting a law that would be a “check on
the enforcement of sex-role stereotypes that had historically limited
men’s and women’s opportunities.”30

http://blog.legalsolutions.thomsonreuters.com/legal-research/today-in-1971-thesupreme-court-decides-its-first-title-vii-sex-discrimination-case/.
22
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. (Phillips I), 411 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1969),
vacated, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. (Phillips II), 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
23
Phillips I, 411 F.2d at 3-4.
24
Phillips II, 400 U.S. at 544.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 543-44.
27
Franklin, supra note 9, at 1326-29.
28
Id. at 1379-80.
29
Id. at 1380.
30
Id. at 1357-58.
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Strict construction of the statute is especially visible where the
Court suggests that a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
exception, which “permits discrimination in cases where such
discrimination is ‘reasonably necessary to the normal operation’ of a
business,” might exist on remand.31 This would allow employers to
have different hiring policies for men and women, if “such conflicting
family obligations [are] demonstrably more relevant to job
performance for a woman than for a man.”32 Justice Marshall, in his
concurrence, was wary of this reading, fearing that the Court was
“fall[ing] into the trap of assuming that the Act permits ancient
canards about the proper role of women to be a basis for
discrimination.”33 He argued that the limited reading of Title VII was
not in line with Congress’s intent to ban the use of “stereotyped
characterizations of the sexes,” which goes beyond a strictly male and
female dichotomy.34
It appeared that the majority stance in the Court was the one
that viewed the prohibition “because of sex” as a prohibition of
employment decisions based on whether a person was a man or a
woman. However, Justice Marshall’s concurrence and the statements
in the congressional record from the proponents of adding “sex” to
Title VII35 supplied hope for those who favored a broader reading that
included protection against sex-role stereotypes.36 Homosexuals and
other sexual minorities, whose workplace protection seems dependent
on a reading of Title VII that goes past biological sex and prohibits sex
stereotyping, fall into this group. Thus, shortly after Phillips, cases
started arriving in federal circuit courts, arguing that discrimination
based on sexual orientation was “because of sex.”37
Unfortunately for sexual minorities, the early cases followed
Phillips’ per curium interpretation, with the circuits viewing

31

Id. at 1315 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1356 (quoting Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. (Phillips II), 400 U.S. 542,
544 (1971)).
33
Phillips II, 400 U.S. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring).
34
Id. (quoting EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. §
1604 1(a)(1)(ii) (1972)).
35
See Franklin, supra note 9, at 1326-29 (acknowledging the general lack of
legislative history for the enactment of Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination,
but discussing the various statements from proponents of the amendment in the
congressional record).
36
Id. at 1357-58.
37
See DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 328-29 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen
& Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977), overruled by, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
32
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discrimination “because of sex” as discrimination based on biological
sex, and not including a ban on discrimination against sexual
minorities.38 In 1977, in Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., the
Ninth Circuit gave deference to the “traditional notions of ‘sex,’”
holding that Title VII did not prohibit employers from discriminating
against transsexuals.39 The Circuit Court mentioned amendments to
Title VII that ban discrimination based on “sexual preference,” but
considered the defeat of these amendments as proof that Congress did
not intend to expand Title VII beyond protecting people from
discrimination for being male or female.40 The Ninth Circuit used this
perceived intent to decline extending Title VII to consider transsexuals
a protected class, calling it a situation that Congress “clearly did not
contemplate.”41
A year later, the Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in
Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., reading even more strongly
into Congress’s supposed intent.42 In Smith, an employer rejected a
male applicant because the interviewer considered him “effeminate.”43
The court found for the employer, again basing its decision on
congressional intent, which was “only to guarantee equal job
opportunities for males and females.”44 The court characterized the
plaintiff’s situation as a “questionable application” of Title VII, and,
without more definitive intent from Congress, it refused to strain the
statute to cover the actions of this employer.45 The court made this
decision in spite of arguments from the plaintiff that the employer
discriminated against him for being “womanly.”46 On top of this, the
plaintiff argued that beyond the employer’s personal opinion of the
plaintiff’s manliness, the employer preferred females for the position
over males.47 This is a situation where the plaintiff alleged activity
that should have been actionable, regardless of the statute’s
interpretation, as the discrimination was based on biological sex.
Two years after Holloway, the Ninth Circuit Court again
encountered the “because of sex” interpretation problem in DeSantis v.
Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., and read the statute in the same
38

See, e.g., Holloway, 566 F.2d at 662 (limiting the “because of sex” language to
exclude transsexuals).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 664.
42
Smith, 569 F.2d at 326-27.
43
Id. at 326.
44
Id. at 327.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
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way.48 In a case dealing with employment discrimination because of
the plaintiffs’ homosexuality, the court bluntly affirmed Holloway,
holding that “Title VII’s prohibition of ‘sex’ discrimination applies
only to discrimination on the basis of gender and should not be
judicially extended to include sexual preference such as
homosexuality.”49 The court, like those discussed above, based its
reasoning on Congress’s refusal to enact explicit protections, even
though “[s]everal bills have been introduced to amend the Civil Rights
Act to prohibit discrimination against ‘sexual preference.’”50
As time passed, little changed when plaintiffs tried to stretch
Title VII’s protection to include discrimination because of sexual
orientation, or “preference,” as the courts described it.51 Even in more
modern cases, courts are unwilling to read wholesale protection
against discrimination based on sexual orientation into Title VII, and
plaintiffs will likely lose if they allege discrimination “because of sex”
based on their sexual orientation or gender identity.52
In 1984, the Seventh Circuit gave deference to the decisions in
DeSantis, Holloway, and Smith, as well as Congress’ alleged intent,
when it ruled against a transsexual female in her employment
discrimination case.53 In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., the Seventh
Circuit discussed how Congress might amend Title VII in the future to
protect transsexuals (and likely homosexuals and other sexual
minorities) from employment discrimination.54 However, the court
was steadfast that the judicial system should not initiate the change,
writing that “if the term ‘sex’ as it is used in Title VII is to mean more
than biological male or biological female, the new definition must
come from Congress.”55
A relatively recent change stems from the key 1998 case of
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, where the Supreme Court
held for the first time that “sexual harassment in the workplace applied
not only to opposite-sex cases, but also to cases in which the harasser
and harassee were of the same sex.”56 Oncale established three

48

See DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id.
50
Id. at 329.
51
See, e.g., Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257 (3rd Cir.
2001); Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984); DeSantis, 608
F.2d at 329-30; Smith, 569 F.2d at 328; Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566
F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1977).
52
See Ulane, 743 F.2d at 1084; Bibby, 260 F.3d at 259.
53
Ulane, 743 F.2d at 1084-86.
54
Id. at 1085-86.
55
Id. at 1087.
56
Diefenbach, supra note 7, at 42.
49
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arguments that plaintiffs could use to prove same-sex sexual
harassment.57 These “evidentiary routes” include providing “credible
evidence that the harasser was homosexual,” that the harassment was
made “in such sex-specific and derogatory terms . . . to make it clear
that the harasser is motivated by general hostility to the presence of
women in the workplace,” and by offering “direct comparative
evidence about how the alleged harasser treated members of both
sexes in a mixed-sex workplace.”58
While providing these routes, the case provided little direction
as to how to apply them, or how much evidence was necessary for a
plaintiff to be successful.59 Though most courts hold that these
“evidentiary routes” are not exclusive, “they have for the most part
adhered to these categories in making their decisions.”60 The Court’s
recognition of the “reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position”
standard was the most helpful language regarding the requisite severity
for harassment to be actionable discrimination.61 The Court held that
“in same-sex (as in all) harassment cases, that inquiry requires careful
consideration of the social context in which particular behavior occurs
and is experienced by its target.”62
The Oncale decision has spurned successful modern cases for
sexual minority plaintiffs. Though “not explicitly stated in the Oncale
opinion,” an earlier Supreme Court case, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, provided additional fuel to the plaintiffs’ fire when it found
that “a plaintiff is entitled to relief if the harassment is based on his or
her perceived failure to conform to gender stereotypes.”63 Combined,
Oncale and Price Waterhouse create opportunities for plaintiffs that
may not fit under the biological sex interpretation of Title VII,
examples of which are discussed below.
While Congress and the courts refuse to adopt explicit
protection for sexual minorities in employment, more recent cases
illustrate clever arguments from lawyers and judges that have led to
favorable language, and even victories, for such plaintiffs.64 In a 2001
case, the Third Circuit again denied a homosexual plaintiff’s

57

Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1998).
Id.
59
See Diefenbach, supra note 7, at 42.
60
Id. at 43.
61
Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
62
Id.
63
See Diefenbach, supra note 7, at 42.
64
See, e.g., Bibby v. Philadelphia Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 259 (3rd
Cir. 2001) (creating a mechanism for future homosexual plaintiffs to prevail in
employment discrimination cases).
58
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discrimination claim, this time in the context of same-sex sexual
harassment.65 However, while holding that “Title VII does not
prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation,” and ruling against
the plaintiff, the Third Circuit outlined ways, depending on the
“evidentiary routes” from Oncale, that, if plead correctly, a plaintiff
belonging to a sexual minority could win a Title VII case:
[T]here are at least three ways by which a plaintiff
alleging same-sex sexual harassment might demonstrate
that the harassment amounted to discrimination because
of sex – the harasser was motivated by sexual desire,
the harasser was expressing a general hostility to the
presence of one sex in the workplace, or the harasser
was acting to punish the victim’s noncompliance with
gender stereotypes.66
The court explained that there might be other ways for a homosexual
plaintiff to prove discrimination because of sex, in addition to the
argument discussed above in Oncale, but failed to describe these other
routes.67
The Court ultimately found for the employer because the
plaintiff’s claim alleged sexual orientation as the basis for
discrimination, when Congress only prohibited sex discrimination
based on biological sex.68 However, this holding was one of the first
indicators that the tide may be shifting for sexual minorities in the
workplace, as the court outlined possible winning arguments in
addition to proclaiming that “harassment on the basis of sexual
orientation has no place in our society.”69
In 2001, the Ninth Circuit abrogated its ruling in DeSantis with
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc., holding that DeSantis
could not stand as good law where it conflicted with Price
Waterhouse.70 Thus, in Nichols, discriminatory attacks on a male
plaintiff’s “feminine mannerisms” were just as actionable as
discrimination against the female plaintiff in Price Waterhouse for
supposed “macho” characteristics.71

65

Id. at 259.
Id. at 261, 264.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 265.
69
Id. at 264-65.
70
Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., 256 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2001).
71
Id. at 874.
66

2015]

CRACKS IN THE SHIELD

81

In Nichols, the court held that a male server was the subject of
illegal sex stereotyping when his fellow employees continuously
referred to him as “she” and “her,” and made fun of him for carrying
his tray “like a woman.”72 Thus, it was no longer legal under Title VII
to discriminate against a male because he appears effeminate, an
opposite conclusion than the one the court reached twenty-two years
earlier in DeSantis.73
In another Ninth Circuit opinion, Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel,
Inc., the court further departed from its historical treatment of
“because of sex” discrimination when it held that the plaintiff, a
homosexual male butler who worked where “all of the other butlers on
the floor, as well as their supervisor, were also male,” successfully
defeated summary judgment by arguing under a gender stereotyping
theory.74 Though the plaintiff worked in a same-sex workforce, the
plurality, basing its opinion on Oncale, held that the nature of the
harassment, which included “offensive sexual touching,” was
actionable under Title VII.75
Due to the nature of the complained behavior, the court held
that the “plaintiff’s sexual orientation was not relevant . . . and a
reasonable jury could conclude . . . that the harassment occurred
because of sex.”76 As one scholar notes, however, “this opinion
contravenes most other appellate opinions that hold that sexual
behavior alone is insufficient to satisfy the ‘because of sex’
requirement.”77 The concurrence agreed that the plaintiff should
defeat summary judgment, but instead based its opinion on “[the] rule
that bars discrimination on the basis of sex stereotypes,” as seen in
Price Waterhouse and Nichols.78 Thus, the strength of the plurality’s
holding is in doubt.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
went even further in Schroer v. Billington, not only ruling for a
transsexual plaintiff on the theory of sex stereotyping, but including
language that opposed the longstanding “congressional intent”
arguments against protecting sexual minorities from discrimination.79

72

Id.
Id. at 875.
74
Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., 305 F.3d 1061, 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2002).
75
Id. at 1067 (“We are presented with the tale of a man who was repeatedly grabbed
in the crotch and poked in the anus, and who was singled out from his other male coworkers for this treatment.”).
76
McGinley, supra note 3, at 742.
77
Id.
78
Rene, 305 F.3d at 1069.
79
Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008).
73
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This case involved a male-to-female transsexual who originally
applied, interviewed, and accepted a job as a male, yet was denied the
job when the employer learned of her plans to transition to a female.80
While Schroer recognized that sex stereotyping existed in the case,
whether the employer made its decision because the plaintiff was “an
insufficiently masculine man, an insufficiently feminine woman, or an
inherently gender-nonconforming transsexual,” the court also
concluded that the plaintiff should win under the plain language of
“because of sex.”81 Dismissing the arguments raised in almost all
earlier cases, the court was not persuaded that Congress’s denial of
Title VII amendments meant that it intended sex to retain its
interpretation of “only prohibit[ing] discrimination against men
because they are men and discrimination against women because they
are women.82 Finding this to be “judge-supposed legislative intent
over clear statutory text,” the court found other reasonable
interpretations for this legislative history.83 Notably, the court found
that members of Congress could feel that earlier courts “interpreted
‘sex’ in an unduly narrow manner,” and that “because of sex” should
already include protection against this type of discrimination.84
Seriously doubting the strength of precedent, the court found that the
employer’s refusal to hire the plaintiff “after being advised that she
planned to change her anatomical sex by undergoing sex reassignment
surgery was literally discrimination ‘because of . . . sex.’”85
More recently, the Third Circuit overturned summary judgment
for an employer, finding that nothing in Title VII disqualifies a person
from bringing a gender stereotyping claim simply because a person
belongs to a sexual minority.86 The court held that, “[a]s long as the
employee—regardless of his or her sexual orientation—marshals
sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could conclude such that
harassment or discrimination occurred ‘because of sex,’ the case is not
appropriate for summary judgment.”87 The Fifth Circuit reached a
similar conclusion to preclude summary judgment in a same-sex
harassment case in 2012.88
80

Id. at 295-300.
Id. at 305-06.
82
Id. at 307-08.
83
Id. at 307.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
86
Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 292 (3rd Cir. 2009).
87
Id.
88
Cherry v. Shaw Coastal, Inc., 668 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding that the
plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to prove that the harassment from the
plaintiff’s supervisor was sexual in nature, and that the harassment was severe and
81
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While it appears that some circuits are willing to read some
breadth into Title VII’s ban on sex discrimination, other circuits are
opposed to this interpretation.89 The common opposing argument is
that sexual minorities are using gender stereotyping under Price
Waterhouse to inappropriately “bootstrap protection for sexual
orientation into Title VII,” under a guise of sex stereotyping.90
Bootstrapping refers to the theory that sexual minority plaintiffs will
emphasize the gender stereotyping part of their case, while distancing
themselves from discrimination based on status as a sexual minority,
in order to receive Title VII protection in the absence of explicit
protection.91
First posited in Simonton v. Runyon,92 the anti-bootstrapping
argument was the basis for ruling against the plaintiff in Dawson v.
Bumble & Bumble.93 The Second Circuit stood firmly on its own
precedent that “Title VII does not prohibit harassment or
discrimination because of sexual orientation.”94 Therefore, anything
the plaintiff alleged that amounted to discrimination because of her
sexual orientation could not “satisfy the first element of a prima facie
case under Title VII because the statute does not recognize
homosexuals as a protected class.”95 Similarly, in Vickers v. Fairfield
Medical Center, the Sixth Circuit, relying on language from Dawson,
used the anti-bootstrapping argument to grant summary judgment
against a plaintiff who based his claim on accusations of
homosexuality from his coworkers.96
Taking all of this judicial history into account, circuit courts
today are expanding their reading of Title VII to supply possible
avenues for sexual minorities to seek relief for employment
discrimination, relying on Oncale and Price Waterhouse. Conversely,
other circuits, namely the Second Circuit, see these decisions as
undesirable, considering these decisions a work-around to established
case law.97 This circuit-split leaves plaintiffs in a state of uncertainty.

pervasive; the evidence included repeated sexual touching, including touching
plaintiff’s rear end, as well as sexual text messages).
89
See, e.g., Dawson v. Bumble & Bumble, 398 F.3d 211, 218 (2nd Cir. 2005)
(opposing a broader interpretation).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
See Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 2000).
93
Dawson, 398 F.3d at 217.
94
Id.
95
Id. at 217-18.
96
Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006).
97
See Dawson, 398 F.3d at 218.
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In the face of this uncertainty, it is imperative that Congress, in
the absence of a Supreme Court decision, pass legislation like ENDA
to protect sexual minorities. Explicit protection is even more
necessary given that rulings based on Price Waterhouse appear to
protect only effeminate men or masculine women, and leave the door
open for discrimination against those in the sexual minority that fall
within classic gender stereotypes (i.e. masculine men and effeminate
women). Even if Schroer is the correct interpretation and Title VII
already includes protection under the “because of sex” language, as
long as circuits are splitting, plaintiffs will never have a dependable
federal cause of action.
III. STATE ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS AND ISSUES
In response to the lack of protection in the federal courts, many
states have enacted laws to protect sexual minorities from employment
discrimination.98 As of 2013, twenty-one states and the District of
Columbia have enacted statutes prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation.99
Of those states, seventeen also prohibit
discrimination based on gender identity.100 In addition to these states,
twelve others have “an executive order, administrative order or
personnel regulation prohibiting discrimination against public
employees based on sexual orientation.”101 Moreover, “at least 225
cities and counties prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of
gender identity.”102

98

See McGinley, supra note 3, at 728.
See SARAH WARBELOW , HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOUND., EQUALITY FROM
STATE TO STATE 2013 12 (2013), available at http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east1.amazonaws.com//files/assets/resources/equalitystatetostate_2013.pdf#__utma=149
406063.87606283.1424944960.1424945041.1424945061.3&__utmb=149406063.1.1
0.1424945061&__utmc=149406063&__utmx=&__utmz=149406063.1424945061.3.3.utmcsr=google|utmccn=(organic)|utmcmd=or
ganic|utmctr=(not%20provided)&__utmv=-&__utmk=264664335. The author
includes the following list of states that have enacted protective legislation:
California (1992, 2003), Colorado (2007), Connecticut (1991, 2011), Delaware
(2009, 2013), District of Columbia (1977, 2006), Hawaii (1991, 2011), Illinois
(2006), Iowa (2007), Massachusetts (1989, 2012), Maine (2005), Maryland (2001),
Minnesota (1993), New Hampshire (1998), New Jersey (1992, 2007), New Mexico
(2003), New York (2003) Nevada (1999, 2011), Oregon (2008), Rhode Island (1995,
2001), Vermont (1991, 2007), Washington (2006), and Wisconsin (1982). Id.
100
Id. (noting that, of the 21 states listed above, Maryland, New Hampshire, New
York, and Wisconsin limit their protection to sexual orientation).
101
Id.
102
Cities and Counties with Non-Discrimination Ordinances that Include Gender
Identity, HUM . RTS. CAMPAIGN (JAN . 28, 2015),
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Many of these state regulations, however, differ in their
language, what they protect, and which types of employees they
protect.103 The next discussion seeks to illustrate the differences by
examining a handful of state laws.
In California, it is unlawful:
For an employer, because of the race, religious creed,
color, national origin, ancestry, physical disability,
mental disability, medical condition, genetic
information, marital status, sex, gender, gender identity,
gender expression, age, sexual orientation, or military
and veteran status of any person, to refuse to hire or
employ the person or to refuse to select the person for a
training program leading to employment, or to bar or to
discharge the person from employment or from a
training program leading to employment, or to
discriminate against the person in compensation or in
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.104
Thus, California’s non-discrimination provision covers both sexual
orientation, and gender identity and expression.105 Perhaps the most
interesting part of this provision is that it includes both “sex” and
“gender,” which many federal courts, both past and present, find to
mean the same thing: biological sex.106 The inclusion of both infers
that California viewed them as separate protections. The rest of the
statute is identical to the provisions of Title VII, even explicitly
including training programs as a protected form of employment.107
California decided to implement its protection for sexual
minorities by including them as a protected class, listing their traits in
the same line of protected traits as Title VII.108 The California cases
that have dealt with sexual minority plaintiffs suing under these
provisions, known as the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA),
have said little about these new protections, and seem to accept sexual

http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/cities-and-counties-with-non-discriminationordinances-that-include-gender.
103
See, e.g., WARBELOW , supra note 99, at 32-38 (describing a number of
drastically different anti-discrimination bills).
104
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940 (2014) (emphasis added).
105
Id.
106
See discussion supra Part I.
107
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
108
Id.
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minorities as a protected class, instead moving straight to the merits of
the case.109
In Oregon and Nevada,
we see a similar protection
implemented, again writing the protection into the already established
Title VII protected classes. 110 However, a couple of things differ from
California. Oregon makes it unlawful:
For an employer, because of an individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital
status or age if the individual is 18 years of age or
older, or because of the race, color, religion, sex, sexual
orientation, national origin, marital status or age of any
other person with whom the individual associates, or
because of an individual’s juvenile record that has been
expunged pursuant to ORS 419A.260 and 419A.262, to
refuse to hire or employ the individual or to bar or
discharge the individual from employment.111
It also prohibits discrimination against an individual in
compensation, or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment, if
based on the same protected characteristics.112 The statute only lists
sexual orientation in its protected “because of” provisions, and only
includes “sex” as opposed to California’s “sex” and “gender,” which
could cause some to believe that Oregon only protects against
discrimination based on biological sex and sexual orientation.113
However, Oregon clarifies its meaning of “sexual orientation” in the
definitions section, defining it as “an individual’s actual or perceived
heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality or gender identity.”114
Thus, while the text of Oregon’s non-discrimination statute
appears to protect sexual orientation, but not gender identity, Oregon
defines “sexual orientation” to include gender identity, thereby
protecting all sexual minorities.115 Furthermore, this definition of
“sexual orientation” appears to codify some of the sex stereotyping
language of Price Waterhouse when it qualified the category to protect

109

See, e.g., Hope v. California Youth Auth., 134 Cal. App. 4th 577, 587 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2005); Murray v. Oceanside Unified School Dist., 79 Cal. App. 4th 1338, 1347
(Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
110
See NEV . REV . STAT . § 613.330 (2011); OR . REV . STAT . § 659A.030 (2013).
111
OR . REV . STAT . § 659A.030(a).
112
OR . REV . STAT . § 659A.030(b).
113
Id.
114
OR . REV . STAT . § 174.100(6).
115
Id.

2015]

CRACKS IN THE SHIELD

87

“regardless of whether the individual’s gender identity, appearance,
expression or behavior differs from that traditionally associated with
the individual’s sex at birth.”116
Meanwhile, Nevada takes a more conservative approach to
including sexual minorities as a protected class, simply adding both
sexual orientation and gender identity in the text as protected
classes.117 The rest of the statute reads identical to Title VII, though a
later section includes an exception allowing employers to impose
reasonable grooming and dress standards, as long as the appearance
requirement allows employees to dress consistent with their gender
identity or expression.118
No helpful case law exists to determine how local courts have
interpreted these statutes; perhaps because both states have
independent administrative agencies, the Bureau of Labor and
Industries (BOLI) in Oregon,119 and the Nevada Equal Rights
Commission (NERC),120 to address such actions. These agencies
provide administrative remedies, exhaustion of which “is necessary to
prevent the courts from being inundated with frivolous claims.”121 In
one Oregon case, though brought as a retaliation claim, the Court of
Appeals, like the California courts, treated sexual orientation as a
protected class, and applied the substantive retaliation law to find for
the plaintiff, concluding that the “plaintiff opposed sexual orientation
discrimination and was fired as a result.”122
Elsewhere, we continue to see state non-discrimination laws,
with different language, yet similar intent and effect, other than the
divide among states regarding gender identity protection. Maine, for
example, follows the same approach as Oregon, including sexual
orientation in its protected classes, and then expounding upon sexual
orientation in a definition section to include gender identity.123 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine recognized sexual orientation as a
protected class in a case where the superintendent failed to renew the
contract of a high school coach, who happened to be a lesbian.124 The
plaintiff successfully defeated summary judgment by proving a

116

Id.
See NEV . REV . STAT . § 613.330 (2011).
118
NEV . REV . STAT . § 613.350.
119
See A.L.P. Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 984 P.2d 883, 884 (Or. Ct. App.
1999).
120
See Pope v. Motel 6, 114 P.3d 277, 280 (Nev. 2005).
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Id.
122
Wilmoth v. Ann Sacks Tile & Stone, Inc., 197 P.3d 567, 577 (Or. Ct. App. 2008).
123
ME. REV . STAT . tit. 5, § 4553(9-C) (2012).
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Cookson v. Brewer Sch. Dep’t., 974 A.2d 276, 284 (Me. 2009).
117

88

Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice

[Vol. 4:1

genuine issue of material fact existed based on “the timing of the
[superintendent’s] decision, relative to when he knew of [plaintiff’s]
sexual orientation.”125
Another case, relating to public accommodations rather than
employment, held that a school violated the Maine Human Rights Act
by requiring a transgender girl use the unisex staff bathroom rather
than the girl’s bathroom.126 Maine’s public accommodation statute
only lists sexual orientation discrimination in its prohibitions.127 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, however, following the state’s
statutory definition section, held that the school’s decision “constituted
discrimination based on [plaintiff’s] sexual orientation.”128 This
decision illustrates another difference between Maine and other states,
where its non-discrimination statute is included in a broader human
rights statute that prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation
in employment as well as “in public accommodations, educational
opportunities, housing, and other areas.”129
New Jersey, on the other hand, employs the same statutory
method as Nevada, simply listing sexual orientation and gender
identity as protected classes in its Title VII-style statute.130 In a case
prior to enactment of the current statute, a New Jersey court indicated
that it viewed sexual orientation discrimination and gender
discrimination as separate protections, unlike the Oregon and Maine
statutes.131 While a male-to-female transsexual could not “establish a
prima facie case for discrimination based on her affectional or sexual
orientation because she was not a homosexual or bisexual or perceived
to be homosexual or bisexual,”132 the Court held that she could
succeed on a claim of sex discrimination because “sex discrimination
under the [New Jersey Law Against Discrimination] includes gender
discrimination so as to protect [a] plaintiff from gender stereotyping
and discrimination for transforming herself from a man to a
woman.”133
Wisconsin, “the first state legislature in the nation to prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation,” did so by passing
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Doe v. Reg’l Sch. Unit 26, 86 A.3d 600, 606 (Me. 2014).
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ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, § 4592(1).
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Doe, 86 A.3d at 606.
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Id. at 604.
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See N.J. STAT . § 10:5-12 (2014).
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Chapter 112, also known as the Wisconsin Act, in 1981.134 Although
Wisconsin’s codified non-discrimination statutes use language
practically identical to Title VII, including sex and the types of
discriminatory actions prohibited by the statute, they do not mention
sexual orientation. 135 Instead, Wisconsin includes an “exceptions and
special cases” section in the statute to explain that prohibited
discrimination “because of sex” includes discrimination based on
sexual orientation.136 Interestingly enough, though Wisconsin was the
first state to protect against discrimination based on sexual orientation,
it does not protect gender identity.137
With the inclusion of sexual orientation in its “because of sex”
definition, Wisconsin has laws at odds with the majority of federal
court precedent, which interpret sex to mean biological sex.138 By
expanding the “because of sex” definition to include sexual
orientation, but explicitly excluding gender identity, Wisconsin opens
up its own statute to possibilities of broader or narrower interpretation.
An expansion to protection will likely be given, however, because of
the policy statement preceding the statute, calling for it to be “liberally
construed” to meet its purpose of “encourag[ing] and foster[ing] to the
fullest extent practicable the employment of all properly qualified
individuals regardless of . . . sex [or] . . . sexual orientation.”139 So far,
it appears that Wisconsin courts, similar to the states discussed above,
treat sexual orientation discrimination in the same way it treats
discrimination against other protected classes, finding the
discrimination cognizable and moving to other aspects of the case.140
However, due to the lack of case law, it does not appear that
Wisconsin courts have heard gender identity discrimination cases.
Thus, the opportunities to expand the law are unfounded.
The major takeaway from these laws, especially Wisconsin’s
unique application, is that uncertainty still looms for plaintiffs, even in
states that have non-discrimination protections. Together these
different state laws create an “uneven patchwork of protection against
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See William B. Turner, The Gay Rights State: Wisconsin’s Pioneering Legislation
to Prohibit Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation, 22 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 91,
93 (2007).
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See WIS. STAT . §§ 111.321-.322 (2010).
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WIS. STAT . § 111.36(1)(d)(1).
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See WARBELOW, supra note 99, at 12.
138
See discussion supra Part I.
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WIS. STAT . § 111.31.
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See Bowen v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 730 N.W.2d 164, 170 (Wis. Ct.
App. 2007) (holding that sexual orientation discrimination, just like other types of
employment discrimination, requires that only one of the alleged incidents creating a
hostile work environment occur during the 300 day filing deadline).
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discrimination.”141 The lack of case law makes it difficult to see the
problems first hand, but it takes little to imagine, given the federal
court rulings compared to the statutes. In this handful of states alone,
we see a state that considers “gender” and “sex” to be different,142
states that believe sexual orientation includes gender identity,143 and
states that have added gender identity separately.144
While it is a welcome change to see states prohibiting
discrimination against sexual minorities, minefields now exist for
practitioners and plaintiffs to navigate. Many state statutes, prior to
the inclusion of protections for sexual orientation and gender identity,
were “modeled after Title VII, so that federal case law regarding Title
VII is applicable to construe the Act[s].”145 Now, states must depend
on their judges to interpret statutes based on Title VII, without the
benefit of federal precedent, as Title VII does not include many of the
protections found in modern state statutes. In fact, states that expand
the “because of sex” definition now face an interpretation outlawed by
federal circuits, so they must base their conclusions on textual
interpretation, in effect creating their own common law.
Then, there are the states that do not protect individuals at all,
allowing people with protection in one state to be discriminated
against when seeking employment in a neighboring state.146 This is
why members of Congress continue to introduce federal legislation
banning employment discrimination against sexual minorities, and
why legislation is necessary to create a dependable legal system aimed
at equality in the workplace.147
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IV. ENDA: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE, AND ITS EFFECT ON THE
STATES
While explicit protection for sexual minorities in employment
only exists at the state level, members of Congress have long
recognized the issue, attempting to pass federal legislation to protect
these individuals for the last forty years.148 The first attempt came
from Representative Bella Abzug, a Democrat from New York known
for her “activism and pioneering spirit.”149 Representative Abzug
introduced the Equality Act in 1974, the first bill of its kind, which
would have added sexual orientation and marital status to the protected
classes under Title VII.150 The bill failed to make it out of committee,
and died without going to a vote.151 Representative Abzug returned
the next year, again offering an amendment to Title VII, this time
garnering four cosponsors; however, this bill met the same fate.152
Congress referred it to committee, where they took no action, and the
bill died.153
Since Representative Abzug’s attempts in the mid-1970s,
members of Congress have made multiple attempts to amend Title VII
to include protections based on sexual orientation.154 From 1975 to
1993, a Democratic legislator introduced a Civil Rights Amendment
Act almost every other year.155 While some of these attempts garnered
more cosponsors than others, and some even made it through
committee, each met the same fate and died in committee or
subcommittee.156
After dealing with failure for nearly twenty years, supporters of
rights for sexual minorities “switched tactics by introducing the standalone Employment Non-Discrimination Act [(ENDA)] in 1994.”157
Senator Edward Kennedy, a Democrat from Massachusetts, introduced
the bill in the Senate, while Representative Gerry Studds, also a
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Democrat from Massachusetts, introduced the bill in the House.158
This legislation had more success than any of the previous attempts,
making it to a hearing with the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee before suffering the same fate as previous proposals.159
In 1995, Senator Kennedy reintroduced ENDA in the Senate.160
Though this version only protected sexual orientation, it was a
monumental step because it was brought to a vote.161 On September
10, 1996, the Senate voted for the first time on “the idea of a Federal
non-discrimination clause protecting gays and lesbians in
employment,” losing by only one vote.162 Ironically, on the same day
that the Senate almost passed employment discrimination protection
for homosexuals, it successfully passed the Defense of Marriage Act
(“DOMA”), which was at the opposite end of the gay rights spectrum,
as it limited “marriage under federal law to a union only between a
man and a woman.”163
Though the Senate did not pass ENDA, between 1996 and
2007, members of Congress continued to introduce legislation, albeit
without protection for gender identity or transgendered individuals, all
of which failed to pass.164 In 2007, Representative Barney Frank, a
sexual minority himself,165 reintroduced ENDA in the House of
Representatives.166 This version was more inclusive than previous
drafts, including sexual orientation, both actual and perceived, as well
as gender identity.167 The bill included provisions requiring “adequate
shower or dressing facilities to employees who are transitioning,” but
did not prohibit employers from “imposing reasonable dress or
grooming standards,” as long as they allowed employees to follow the
grooming standard of the gender with which they identify.168
After serious opposition from religious and employer groups,
and a survey of House members,169 Representative Frank realized that
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the bill, as written, would fail.170 As a result, he and other supporters
compromised, eliminating the gender identity provisions as well as the
accommodations for dressing and showering.171
Though this
172
dismayed the sexual minority community, the compromised bill that
defined “sexual orientation” as “homosexuality, heterosexuality, or
bisexuality,”173 passed the House by a vote of 235 to 184.174
Unfortunately, though it made it onto the Senate calendar, the Senate
never took action, and, once again, ENDA failed to reach the
President’s desk.175 Representative Frank subsequently introduced
gender identity inclusive versions of ENDA to Congress in 2009 and
2011.176 Senator Jeff Merkley of Oregon proposed similar versions in
the Senate, only to have them go the way of past attempts.177
This brings us to the current version of the bill, the
Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2013.178 On April 25, 2013,
Senator Merkley and Representative Jared Polis of Colorado
introduced identical bills in the Senate and the House, respectively.179
The 2013 Act states its purpose plainly at the beginning—“to prohibit
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or
gender identity.”180 This shows that the current legislation accords
with the latest failed attempts at ENDA, in that it includes both sexual
orientation and gender identity.
The proposed Act goes deeper into its purposes in the second
section, citing policy considerations such as addressing historical
patterns of discrimination against these groups, and providing an
“explicit, comprehensive Federal prohibition” against this type of
discrimination.181
The comprehensive prohibition entails
“reinforcement [of] the Nation’s commitment to fairness and equal
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opportunity in the workplace consistent with the fundamental right of
religious freedom.”182
Much of the bill follows Title VII, even referring to it for its
definitions of “employee” and “employer.”183 Just as in Title VII, the
2013 ENDA covers employers who have fifteen or more employees
“for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the
current or preceding calendar year,” as well as any agent of an
employer.184 Furthermore, it applies to government employees, but
exempts private membership clubs that are exempt from taxation.185
The two most important definitions in the bill, which are missing from
Title VII, are gender identity and sexual orientation.186 Like prior
versions, ENDA defines “sexual orientation” as “homosexuality,
heterosexuality, or bisexuality,”187 and defines “gender identity” as
“gender-related identity, appearance, or mannerisms or other genderrelated characteristics of an individual, with or without regard to the
individual’s designated sex at birth.”188
After the definition section comes the most important part of
the bill, the types of prohibited discrimination.189 Nearly identical to
the text of Title VII, this Act makes it unlawful to “fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against
any individual with respect to the compensation, terms, conditions, or
privilege of employment of the individual,” or to “limit, segregate, or
classify the employees or applicants for employment of the employer
in any way that would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment or otherwise adversely affect the status of the individual
as an employee” on the basis of a protected classification.190 The
difference is that the protected classes here are solely sexual
orientation or gender identity.191 This current ENDA includes
protections for actual and perceived sexual orientation as well as
gender identity, aligning it with the last two failed attempts and
Representative Frank’s 2007 bill.192 The “actual or perceived”
language is vital for these types of bills, as this discrimination is often
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based on perception, such as someone being “effeminate,” regardless
of whether one’s sexual orientation or gender identity differs from the
employer. 193
Strangely enough, while the bill parallels Title VII, it explicitly
forbids disparate impact claims stating that “only disparate treatment
claims may be brought under this Act.”194 Thus, a claim for
discrimination under this bill would require intentional discrimination
on the part of the employer, and leads some to believe that this
“reinforces the idea that discrimination on the basis of gender identity
or sexual orientation is somehow different—and less objectionable—
than other forms of discrimination.”195 Perhaps to appease the
opponents of the 2007 ENDA, this version includes a broad exemption
for religious organizations, as well as an assurance that “employment”
does not include the members of the armed forces.196
Omitted from the revised 2007 ENDA,197 this bill includes a
provision that allows employers to impose reasonable dress and
grooming standards so long as:
the employer permits any employee who has undergone
gender transition prior to the time of employment, and
any employee who has notified the employer that the
employee has undergone or is undergoing gender
transition after the time of employment, to adhere to the
same dress or grooming standards as apply for the
gender to which the employee has transitioned or is
transitioning.198
However, the 2013 ENDA alters the rest of the construction section.
While the previous two bills had provisions relating to showering and
dressing facilities, requiring an employer to provide “reasonable
access to adequate facilities that are not inconsistent with the
employee’s gender identity,”199 any such provision is noticeably
absent in the current ENDA.200
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Similarly, the rest of the 2013 ENDA leaves out parts of the
construction section from previous bills regarding employee benefits
and marriage, though the marriage exclusion is likely due to the repeal
of DOMA.201 The only other part from past ENDAs retained in the
2013 construction section is a provision explaining that construction of
new facilities is not required to comply with the Act.202
The last notable feature of the 2013 ENDA, another common
feature of previous attempts, is the explanation of ENDA’s
relationship to other laws.203 Section 15 of ENDA states that the Act
“shall not invalidate or limit the rights, remedies, or procedures
available to an individual claiming discrimination prohibited under any
other Federal law or regulation or any law or regulation of a State or
political subdivision of a State.”204 This provision has the practical
effect of allowing a plaintiff to retain his or her right to a cause of
action under Title VII for sex stereotyping or disparate impact, based
on an individual’s sex or gender, even if ENDA passes.205
The 2013 version of ENDA has taken a monumental step
towards becoming law, and assuring sexual minorities equal rights in
the workplace. As mentioned earlier, a version of ENDA previously
passed a House vote, but it did not include protections for gender
identity.206 In fact, no bill including gender identity had ever reached a
vote.207 At least not until November 7, 2013, when the Senate voted to
approve the gender identity inclusive 2013 ENDA, by a vote of 64 to
32.208 This marked the first time that a branch of Congress voted “to
include gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people in the country’s
nondiscrimination law.”209
Given President Obama’s support for ENDA, this Senate
passage seems like a victory for sexual minorities; however, ENDA
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faces one more serious hurdle.210 Speaker of the House, John
Boehner, decides which bills should face a vote in Congress, and he
has repeatedly stated his opposition to ENDA.211 Representative
Boehner believes that ENDA would “increase frivolous litigation and
cost American jobs.”212 As long as Representative Boehner opposes
the bill, ENDA will not come up for a vote or pass during this
congressional session.
Amidst this opposition, Democrats are not sitting quietly. On
March 18, 2014, “220 lawmakers signed a letter to President Barack
Obama urging him to use executive authority to ban workplace
discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
employees of federal contractors.”213 While such action would not
implement full ENDA provisions, requiring federal contractors to
follow its rules would set a positive example for private employers,
and hopefully sway movement towards a full passage. Once again,
while all of this is in flux, we will likely see ENDA die before it
reaches the President’s desk. Opinions are changing, as evidenced by
the bill’s smooth passage in the Senate. However, as President Obama
says, one person belonging to “one party in one house of Congress”
may stand in the way of “millions of Americans who want to go to
work each day and simply be judged by the job they do.”214
The passage of ENDA would have an enormous effect on the
country, as sexual minorities face “widespread discrimination and
harassment in the workplace.”215 As of 2013, “studies show that 15
percent to 43 percent of gay, lesbian, and bisexual people have
experienced some form of discrimination and harassment in the
workplace.”216 With the identifying gay, lesbian, and bisexual
population hovering around 3.5 percent, and the total United States
population around 317 million people, anywhere from 1,664,250 to
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4,770,850 people have experienced discrimination in employment at
some point in their lives.217 With even more likely victims out there
who do not identify with one of these sexual orientations, it is possible
that these numbers are even higher. Furthermore, the problem is more
widespread in the transgender community, with “90 percent of
transgender people report[ing] some form of harassment or
mistreatment on the job or report[ing] having taken some action such
as hiding who they are to avoid it.”218
There are millions of people facing employment
discrimination, yet most of them have no real chance of successfully
seeking remedies for this action outside of state level protections, and
that is only if they live in a state with such non-discrimination
protections.
As evidenced above, federal courts are unwilling to expand
protections under Title VII to include protection for sexual minorities.
While some courts have opened the door by allowing certain “sex
stereotyping” arguments, or going against federal precedent by
including “because of sex” discrimination, these courts are in the
minority. Additionally, these courts face opposition from federal
circuits that argue that Title VII is under attack by improper
“bootstrapping” of the law. Although sexual minorities are not
completely without hope, as many states have their own laws
protecting sexual minorities, these protections exist in a minority of
states, and are inconsistent in how and who they protect. States differ
in their definitions of sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity, and
some only protect sexual orientation, while remaining silent on gender
identity.219
Meanwhile, while the law remains fluid, employers have no
incentive to avoid discrimination against sexual minorities, especially
in states or municipalities that protect neither sexual orientation nor
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gender identity. Because employers want to avoid liability, it is
possible that the limited case law in states with protections for sexual
minorities indicates the laws’ success. Perhaps as employers learn of
the prohibitions, and thus are careful not to discriminate against these
protected classes, the amount of cases brought to determine whether or
not someone is protected have dwindled.
It is for these reasons that federal legislation, such as the
current Employment Non-Discrimination Act, is necessary. We have
reached a point where victims of this discrimination deserve a
dependable route to the courts. The Supreme Court has stated that the
central purposes of Title VII are “eradicating discrimination
throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries
suffered through past discrimination.”220 With no federal legislation,
and limited or no state legislation, little prevents employers from
discriminating against sexual minorities. Left to federal courts to
make nuanced arguments, or to individual states where each protection
is different, victims will be uncertain whether they can make a prima
facie case, let alone explain the merits of their situation. This
frustrates the purpose of Title VII.
The opposing argument is becoming increasingly convoluted.
Even if protection is possible under current law, it is time to stop
arguing whether a court should hear from a homosexual or
transgendered plaintiff. Instead, we should move to a body of law
where individuals can get through the door of every court and have a
judge listen to their story. Furthermore, federal legislation would
resolve state discrepancies. It would also allow for a larger body of
case law, making Title VII cases persuasive authority for cases under
ENDA. Congress could even improve current legislation and state
laws by including a larger definitions section to settle the interpretive
arguments over “sex,” “sexual orientation,” and “gender identity.”
The bottom line is that the time for ENDA is now. Even if
current laws could potentially protect sexual minorities, federal
legislation will be a speedier and more reliable solution to employment
discrimination against sexual minorities.
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